The M16 (more formally Rifle, Caliber5.56 mm, M16) is the United States military designation for the AR-15 rifle. Colt purchased the rights to the AR-15 from Armalite and currently uses that designation only for semi-automatic versions of the rifle. The M16 rifle fires the 5.56x45 cartridge and can produce massive wounding effects when the bullet impacts at high velocity and yaws in tissue leading to fragmentation and rapid transfer of energy.
The M16 entered United States Army service and was deployed for jungle warfare operations in South Vietnam in 1963,becoming the standard U.S. rifle of the Vietnam war by 1969, replacing the M14 rifle in that role. The U.S. Army retained the M14 in CONUS, Europe, and South Korea until 1970. Since the Vietnam War, the M16 rifle family has been the primary infantry rifle of the U.S. military. With its variants, it has been in use by 15 NATO countries, and is the most produced firearm in its caliber. The M16 is being phased out in the United States Army and is being replaced by the M4 Carbine series as of 2010.
The M16 is a lightweight, 5.56 mm, air-cooled, gas-operated, magazine-fed assault rifle, with a rotating-bolt, actuated by direct impingement gas operation. The rifle is made of steel, 7075 aluminium alloy, composite plastics and polymer materials.
The US Air Forces's rifle, the M16, and the United States Marine Corps and Army rifle, the XM16E1, were the first versions of the M16 rifle fielded. Soon, the U.S. Army standardized the XM16E1 as the M16A1 rifle, an M16 with a forward assist feature requested by the Army. All of the early versions were chambered to fire the M193/M196 cartridge in the semi-automatic and the automatic firing modes. This occurred in the early 1960s, with the Army issuing it in late 1964. Commercial AR-15s were first issued to Special Forces troops in spring of 1964.
The M16A2 rifle entered service in the 1980s, chambered to fire the standard NATO cartridge, the Belgian-designed M855/M856 cartridge. The M16A2 is a select-fire rifle (semi-automatic fire, three-round-burst fire) incorporating design elements requested by the Marine Corps: an adjustable, windage rear-sight; a stock 5/8-inch longer; heavier barrel; case deflector for left-hand shooters; and cylindrical hand guards. The fire mode selector is on the receiver's left side. The M16A2 is still the primary rifle in the U.S.Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, and still is in heavy use in the Army and Marine Corps.
The M16A3 rifle is an M16A2 rifle with an M16A1's fire control group (semi-automatic fire, automatic fire) and removable carry handle mounted on a flat top receiver, used only by the U.S. Navy.
The M16A4 rifle was standard issue for the United States Marine Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom; it replaced the M16A2 in front line units. In the U.S. Army the M16A2 rifle is being supplemented with two rifle models, the M16A4 and the M4 Carbine as the standard issue assault rifle. The M16A4 has a flat-top receiver developed for the M4 carbine, a handguard with four Picatinny rails for mounting a sight, laser, night vision device, forward handgrip, removable handle, or a flash light.
The M16 rifle is principally manufactured by Colt and Fabrique National de Herstal (under a U.S. military contract since 1988 by FNH-USA; currently in production since 1991, primarily M16A2, A3, and A4), with variants made elsewhere in the world. Versions for the U.S. military have also been made by H&R Firearms General Motors Hydramatic Division and most recently by Sabre Defence. Semi-automatic versions of the AR-15 are popular recreational shooting rifles, with versions manufactured by other small and large manufacturers in the U.S.
ArmaLite sold its rights to the AR-15 to Colt in 1959. The AR-15 was first adopted in 1962 by the United States Air Force, ultimately receiving the designation M16. The U.S. Army began to field the XM16E1 en masse in 1965 with most of them going to the Republic of Vietnam, and the newly organized and experimental Airmobile Divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry Division in particular. The U.S. Marine Corps in South Vietnam also experimented with the M16 rifle in combat during this period. The XM16E1 was standardized as the M16A1 in 1967. This version remained the primary infantry rifle of U.S. forces in South Vietnam until the end of the war in 1975, and remained with all U.S. military ground forces after it had replaced the M14 Service rifle in 1970 in CONUS, Europe (Germany), and South Korea; when it was supplemented by the M16A2. During the early 1980s a roughly standardized load for this ammunition was adopted throughout NATO.
The M16A3 is a fully-automatic variant of the M16A2, issued within the United States Navy. The M16A2 is currently being supplemented by the M16A4, which incorporates the flattop receiver unit developed for the M4 carbine, and Picatinny rail system. M16A2s are still in stock with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, but are used primarily by reserve and National Guard units as well as by the U.S. Air Force.
The M16 rifle design, including variant or modified version of it such as the Armalite/Colt AR-15 series, AAI M15 rifle; AP74; EAC J-15; SGW XM15A; any 22-caliber rimfire variant, including the Mitchell M16A-1/22, Mitchell M16/22, Mitchell CAR-15/22, and AP74 Auto Rifle, is a prohibited and restricted weapon in Canada.
In 1948, the Army organized the civilian Operations Research Office, mirroring similar operations research organizations in the United Kingdom. One of their first efforts, Project ALCLAD, studied body armour and the conclusion was that they would need to know more about battlefield injuries in order to make reasonable suggestions. Over 3 million battlefield reports from World War I and World War II were analyzed and over the next few years they released a series of reports on their findings.
The conclusion was that most combat takes place at short range. In a highly mobile war, combat teams ran into each other largely by surprise; and the team with the higher firepower tended to win. They also found that the chance of being hit in combat was essentially random; accurate "aiming" made little difference because the targets no longer sat still. The number one predictor of casualties was the total number of bullets fired. Other studies of behavior in battle revealed that many U.S. infantrymen (as many as 2/3) never actually fired their rifles in combat. By contrast, soldiers armed with rapid fire weapons were much more likely to have fired their weapons in battle. These conclusions suggested that infantry should be equipped with a fully-automatic rifle of some sort in order to increase the actual firepower of regular soldiers. It was also clear, however, that such weapons dramatically increased ammunition use and in order for a rifleman to be able to carry enough ammunition for a firefight they would have to carry something much lighter.
Existing rifles met none of these criteria. Although it appeared the new 7.62 mm T44 (precursor to the M14) would increase the rate of fire, its heavy 7.62 mm NATO cartridge made carrying significant quantities of ammunition difficult. Moreover, the length and weight of the weapon made it unsuitable for short range combat situations often found in jungle and urban combat or mechanized warfare, where a smaller and lighter weapon could be brought to bear faster.
These efforts were noticed by Colonel Rene Studler, U.S. Army Ordnance's Chief of Small Arms Research and Development. Col. Studler asked the Aberdeen Proving Ground to submit a report on the smaller caliber weapons. A team led by Donald Hall, director of program development at Aberdeen, reported that a .22 inch (5.56 mm) round fired at a higher velocity would have performance equal to larger rounds in most combat. With the higher rate of fire possible due to lower recoil it was likely such a weapon would inflict more casualties on the enemy. His team members, notably William C. Davis, Jr. and Gerald A. Gustafson, started development of a series of experimental .22 (5.56 mm) cartridges. In 1955, their request for further funding was denied.
A new study, Project SALVO, was set up to try to find a weapon design suited to real-world combat. Running between 1953 and 1957 in two phases, SALVO eventually suggested that a weapon firing four rounds into a 20-inch (508 mm) area would double the hit probability of existing semi-automatic weapons.
In the second phase, SALVO II, several experimental weapons concepts were tested. Irwin Barr of AAI Corporation introduced a series of flechette weapons, starting with a shotgun shell containing 32 darts and ending with single-round flechette "rifles". Winchester and Springfield Armoury offered multi-barrel weapons, while ORO's own design used two .22, .25 or .27 caliber bullets loaded into a single .308 Winchester or .30-06 cartridge.
Meanwhile testing of the 7.62 mm T44 continued, and Fabruiqe National also submitted their new FN FAL via the American firm Harrington & Richardson as the T48. The T44 was selected as the new battle rifle for the U.S. Army (rechristened the M14) despite a strong showing by the T48.
In 1954, Eugene Stoner of the newly-formed Armalite helped develop the 7.62 mm AR-10. Springfield's T44 and similar entries were conventional rifles using wood for the "furniture" and otherwise built entirely of steel using mostly forged and machined parts. ArmaLite was founded specifically to bring the latest in designs and alloys to firearms design, and Stoner felt he could easily beat the other offerings.
The AR-10's receiver was made of forged and milled aluminium alloy instead of steel. The barrel was mated to the receiver by a separate hardened steel extension to which the bolt locked. This allowed a lightweight aluminum receiver to be used while still maintaining a steel-on-steel lockup. The bolt was operated by high-pressure combustion gases taken from a hole in the middle of the barrel directly through a tube above the barrel to a cylinder created in the bolt carrier with the bolt carrier itself acting as a piston. Traditional rifles located this cylinder and piston close to the gas vent. The stock and grips were made of a glass-reinforced plastic shell over a rigid foam plastic core. The muzzle brake was fabricated from titanium. Over Stoner's objections, various experimental composite and 'Sullaloy' aluminum barrels were fitted to some AR-10 prototypes by ArmaLite's president, George Sullivan. The Sullaloy barrel was made entirely of heat-treated aluminum, while the composite barrels used aluminium extruded over a thin stainless steel liner.
Meanwhile the layout of the weapon itself was also somewhat different. Previous designs generally placed the sights directly on the barrel, using a bend in the stock to align the sights at eye level while transferring the recoil down to the shoulder. This meant that the weapon tended to rise when fired making it very difficult to control during fully-automatic fire. The ArmaLite team used a solution previously used on weapons such as the German FG-42and Johnson light machine gun; they located the barrel in line with the stock, well below eye level, and raised the sights to eye level. The rear sight was built into a carrying handle over the receiver.
Despite being over 2 Ib (0.9 kg) lighter than the competition, the AR-10 offered significantly greater accuracy and recoil control. Two prototype rifles were delivered to the U.S. Army's Springfield Armory for testing late in 1956. At this time, the U.S. armed forces were already two years into a service rifle evaluation program, and the AR-10 was a newcomer with respect to older, more fully-developed designs. Over Stoner's continued objections, George Sullivan had insisted that both prototypes be fitted with composite aluminum/steel barrels. Shortly after a composite barrel burst on one prototype in 1957, the AR-10 was rejected. The AR-10 was later produced by a dutch firm, Artillerie Inrichtingen, and saw limited but successful military service with several foreign nations such as Sudan, Guatemala, and Portugal. Portugal deployed a number of AR-10s for use by its airborne (Ca adoresP ra-quedista) battalions, and the rifle saw considerable combat service in Portugal's Counter-Insergency Campaigns in Angola and Mozambique. Some AR-10 rifles were still in service with airborne forces serving during the withdrawal from Portuguese Timor in 1975.
n 1957, a copy of Gustafson's funding request from 1955 found its way into the hands of General Willard G. Wyman, commander of the U.S. Continental Army Command. He immediately put together a team to develop a .223 caliber (5.56 mm) weapon for testing. Their finalized request called for a select-fire weapon of 6 pounds (2.7 kg) when loaded with 20 rounds of ammunition. The bullet had to penetrate a standard U.S. steel helmet, body armor, or a 0.135 inch (3.4 mm) steel plate and retain a velocity in excess of the speed of sound at 500 yards (460 m), while equaling or exceeding the "wounding" ability of the .30 Carbine.
Wyman had seen the AR-10 in an earlier demonstration, and impressed by its performance he personally suggested that ArmaLite enter a weapon for testing using a 5.56 mm cartridge designed by Winchester. Their first design, using conventional layout and wooden furniture, proved to be too light. When combined with a conventional stock, recoil was excessive in fully automatic fire. Their second design was simply a scaled-down AR-10, and immediately proved much more controllable. Winchester entered a design based loosely on their M1 Carbine, and Earle Harvey of Springfield attempted to enter a design, but was overruled by his superiors at Springfield, who refused to divert resources from the T44.
In the end, ArmaLite's AR-15had no competition. The lighter round allowed the rifle to be scaled down, and was smaller and lighter than the previous AR-10. The AR-15 weighed only around 5.5 Ib (2.5 Kg) empty, 6 Ib (2.7 Kg) loaded (with a 20 round magazine).
During testing in March 1958, rainwater caused the barrels of both the ArmaLite and Winchester rifles to burst, causing the Army to once again press for a larger round, this time at .258 in (6.6 mm). Nevertheless, they suggested continued testing for cold-weather suitability in Alaska. Stoner was later asked to fly in to replace several parts, and when he arrived he found the rifles had been improperly reassembled. When he returned he was surprised to learn that they too had rejected the design even before he had arrived; their report also endorsed the .258 in (6.6 mm) round. After reading these reports, General Maxwell Taylor became dead-set against the design, and pressed for continued production of the M14.
Not all the reports were negative. In a series of mock-combat situations testing the AR-15, M14 and AK-47, the Army found that the AR-15's small size and light weight allowed it to be brought to bear much more quickly, just as CONARC had suggested. Their final conclusion was that an 8-man team equipped with the AR-15 would have the same firepower as a current 11-man team armed with the M14.
At this point, Fairchild had spent $1.45 million in development expenses, and wished to divest itself of its small-arms business. Fairchild sold production rights for the AR-15 to Colt Firearms in December 1959, for only $75,000 cash and a 4.5% royalty on subsequent sales. In 1960, ArmaLite was reorganized, and Stoner left the company.
Curtis LeMay viewed a demonstration of the AR-15 in July 1960. In the summer of 1961, General LeMay had been promoted to the position of USAF Chief of Staff, and requested an order of 80,000 AR-15s for the U.S. Air Force. However under the recommendation of General Maxwell D. Taylor, who advised the Commander in Chief that having two different calibers within the military system at the same time would be problematic, President Kennedy turned down the request. However, Advanced Research Projects Agency, which had been created in 1958 in response to the Soviet Sputnik program, embarked on Project AGILE in the spring of 1961. AGILE's priority mission was to devise inventive fixes to the communist problem in South Vietnam. In October 1961, William Godel, a senior man at ARPA, sent 10 AR-15s to South Vietnam to let the allies test them. The reception was enthusiastic, and in 1962 another 1,000 AR-15s were sent to South Vietnam. Special Operations units and advisers working with the South Vietnamese troops filed battlefield reports lavishly praising the AR-15 and the stopping effectiveness of the 5.56 mm cartridge, and pressed for its adoption. However, what no one knew, except the men directly using the AR-15s in Vietnam, were the devastating kills made by the new rifle, photographs of which, showing enemy casualties made by the .223 (5.56 mm) bullet remained classified into the 1980s.
The damage caused by the .223 (5.56mm) "varmint" bullet was observed and originally believed to be caused by "tumbling" due to the slow 1 in 14 inch rifling twist rate.However, this twist rate only made the bullet less stable in air. Any pointed lead core bullet will turn base over point ("tumble") after penetration in flesh, because the center of gravity is aft of the center of the projectile.The large wounds observed by soldiers in Vietnam were actually caused by projectile fragmentation, which was created by a combination of the projectile's velocity and construction.
U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara now had two conflicting views: the ARPA report favoring the AR-15 and the Pentagon's position on the M14. Even President John F. Kennedy expressed concern, so McNamara ordered Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance to test the M14, the AR-15 and the AK-47. The Army's test report stated only the M14 was suitable for Army use, but Vance wondered about the impartiality of those conducting the tests. He ordered the Army Inspector General to investigate the testing methods used, who reported that the testers showed favor to the M14.
Secretary Robert McNamara ordered a halt to M14 production in January 1963, after receiving reports that M14 production was insufficient to meet the needs of the armed forces. Secretary McNamara had long been a proponent of weapons program consolidation among the armed services. At the time, the AR-15 was the only rifle that could fulfill a requirement of a "universal" infantry weapon for issue to all services. McNamara ordered the weapon be adopted unmodified, in its current configuration, for immediate issue to all services, despite receiving reports noting several deficiencies with the M16 as a service rifle, including the lack of a chrome-lined bore and chamber, the 5.56 mm projectile's instability under arctic conditions, and the fact that large quantities of 5.56 mm ammunition required for immediate service were not available. In addition, the Army insisted on the inclusion of a forward assist to help push the bolt into battery in the event that a cartridge failed to seat in the chamber through fouling or corrosion. Colt had argued the rifle was a self-cleaning design, requiring little or no maintenance. Colt, Eugene Stoner, and the U.S. Air Force believed that a forward assist needlessly complicated the rifle, adding about $4.50 to its procurement cost with no real benefit. As a result, the design was split into two variants: the Air Force's M16 without the forward assist, and for the other service branches, the XM16E1 with the forward assist.
In November 1963, McNamara approved the Army's order of 85,000 XM16E1s for jungle warfare operations; and to appease General LeMay, the Air Force was granted an order for another 19,000 M16s. Meanwhile, the Army carried out another project, the Small Arms Weapons Systems, on general infantry firearm needs in the immediate future. They recommended the immediate adoption of the weapon. Later that year the Air Force officially accepted their first batch as the United States Rifle, Caliber 5.56 mm, M16.
The Army immediately began to issue the XM16E1 (re-named M16A1 on its adoption) to infantry units but the rifle was initially delivered without adequate cleaning supplies or instructions. When the M16 reached Vietnam with U.S. troops in March 1965, reports of jamming and malfunctions in combat began to surface. Oftentimes the gun suffered from a jamming flaw known as failure to extract, which meant that a spent cartridge case remained lodged in the chamber after a bullet flew out the muzzle. Although the M14 featured a chrome-lined barrel and chamber to resist corrosion in combat conditions, neither the bore nor the chamber of the M16/XM16E1 was chrome-lined. Several documented accounts of troops killed by enemy fire with jammed rifles broken-down for cleaning eventually brought a Congressional investigation.
The root cause of the jamming issues turned out to be a problem with the powder for the ammunition. In 1964 when the Army was informed that DuPont could not mass-produce the nitrocellulose-based powder to the specifications demanded by the M16, the Olin Mathieson Company provided a high-performance ball propellant of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin. While the Olin WC 846 powder was capable of firing an M16 5.56 mm round at the desired 3,300 ft. per second, it had the unintended consequence of increasing the automatic rate of fire from 850 to 1000 rounds per minute. This would leave behind dirty residue, making the M16 more likely to jam. The problem was resolved by fitting the M16 with a buffer system, slowing the rate of fire back down to 650 to 850 rounds per minute and outfitting all newly produced M16s with an anti corrosive chrome-plated chamber.
On February 28, 1967, the XM16E1 was standardized as the M16A1. Major revisions to the design followed. The rifle was given a chrome-lined chamber (and later, the entire bore) to eliminate corrosion and stuck cartridges, and the rifle's recoil mechanism was re-designed to accommodate Army-issued 5.56 mm ammunition. Rifle cleaning tools and powder solvents/lubricants were issued. Intensive training programs in weapons cleaning were instituted, and a comic style manual was circulated among the troops to demonstrate proper maintenance. The reliability problems of the M16 diminished quickly, although the rifle's reputation continued to suffer.
According to a February 1968 Department of Defence report the M16 rifle achieved widespread acceptance by U.S. troops in Vietnam. Only 38 of 2100 individuals queried wanted to replace the M16 with another weapon. Of those 38, 35 wanted the CAR-15 (a shorter version of the M16) instead.
Keep Low. Move Fast. First Kill. Die LastOne Shot. One Kill. No Luck. Pure Skill.
Yippie Kai Yay, Mr. Falcon.
this one was more wiki than knwledge since i prefer the M-4 over the M-16
The "sniffing" / "breathing" M16, a standard AR-15 tested in Vietnam with an experimental sensor under the barrel. Any more info for it?
Looks like a flamethrower to me.
Thanks to Abraham Gubler we now have an answer:
Thats the E63 or XM-2 Personnel Detector Manpack one of the first electronic noses used to sniff out hidden enemies (in VietNam). Worked as described but couldn't tell apart human and animal smells...
Oh, the "People Sniffer"! It was tested as an airborne detection system as well. Proved a useful device but Vietcong often fooled it by hanging buckets of urine in places they wanted US soldiers to think they were hiding.
We have here the latest in primitive technology.
Internet + Opinions = OMG we are SCREWED!
Yeah, just found that out:
Have a look at Wikipedia.
Interesting PDFs via Catch-22:
You can easily fool those detection methods as well. For night vision, just shine a bright light at them. Thermal detectors are slightly more difficult, but can easily be fooled by hiding behind something equally hot, like an idle vehicle. Or dive into some water to fully hide your heat.
So that we can go back on tiopic I created a separate thread on the E63 detector. It's in the same section.